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Publikationer

Nedan listas de viktigaste publikationerna från våra forskare.

Kommande:

Hartman, Robert J. (kommande) The Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck, co-edited with Ian M. Church (New York: Routledge).

Hartman, Robert J. (kommande) “Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism,” Journal of Philosophical Research, DOI: 10.5840/jpr2017426102

Hartman, Robert J. (kommande) "Accepting Moral Luck," i Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman (red.) The Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck (New York: Routledge).

Hartman, Robert J. (kommande) "Review of Rik Peels' Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology" Ethics.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (kommande) "Review of Derk Pereboom's Free will, agency and meaning in life" Utilitas.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (kommande) "Accountability, answerability and attributability: On different kinds of moral responsibility" Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom (red.), Oxford University Press.

Matheson, Benjamin. (kommande) "The Threat From Manipulation Arguments", American Philosophical Quarterly

Mickelson, Kristin. (kommande) "(In)compatibilism", A Compananion to Free Will, Joseph Campbell (red.), LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Russell, Paul. (kommande) "Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich's Third Way", i Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. G. Caruso, red. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Russell, Paul. (kommande) "Moral Responsibility and Metaphysical Attitudes". i Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom, red., Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.

Szigeti, András. (kommande) Special Issue of Synthese ‘Thinking (About) Groups’, redaktör, med John Andrew Michael och Alessandro Salice.

 

2017

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2017) "Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility", i Philip Robichaud och Jan Willem Wieland (red.). Responsibility - the Epistemic Condition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar och Brülde, Bengt. (2017) "Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources", i Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter och Daniela Cutas (red.) Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics. Dordrecht: Springer. s. 13-33.

Hartman, Robert J. (2017) In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory (New York: Routledge)

Milam, Per-Erik. (2017) "How Is Self-Forgiveness Possible?", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly vol. 98, Issue 1. s. 49-69.

Russell, Paul. (2017) "Free Will Pessimism". Lecture given to the Vitterhetsakademien/The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. Vitterhetsakademien Annual Year Book for 2017. s. 47-63

Russell, Paul. (2017) "Free Will Pessimism". i Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4, redigerad av David Shoemaker. Oxford University Press. s. 93-120.

Russell, Paul. (2017) The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays, (New York: Oxford University Press)

Russell, Paul. (2017) Review of "Conversation and Responsibility" by Michael McKenna. Philosophical Review, 126.2, s. 285-95.

 

2016

Björnsson, Gunnar och Hess, Kendy. (2016) "Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research s. ?-?

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2016) "Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments" Philosophical Psychology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1150448

Björnsson, Gunnar and Pereboom, Derk. (2016) "Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility", i Justin Sytsma och Wesley Buckwalter (red.) Companion to Experimental Philosophy (Chichester: Blackwell). s. 142-157.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(5): s. 1225-1240

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism", Philosophia vol. 44. Issue 3. s. 793-808

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016) "Accountability, Answerability and Freedom", Social Theory and Practice 42(4): s.681-705

Matheson, Benjamin. (2016) "In Defence of the Four-Case Argument", Philosophical Studies 173 (7): s. 1963-1982

Mickelson, Kristin. (2016) "The Manipulation Argument", i Meghan Griffith, Neal Levy, Kevin Timpe, (red.) The Routledge Companion to Free Will. s. 166-178.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2016) "Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46.1: s. 102-122

Russell, Paul. (2016) "Free Will and Moral Sentiments: Strawsonian Theories" i The Routledge Companion to Free Will. M. Griffith, N. Levy and K. Timpe (red.), (New York: Routledge: 2016), s. 96-108.

 

2015

Russell, Paul. (2015) - "’Hume’s Lengthy Digression’: Free Will in the Treatise", invited contribution to Hume’s Treatise: A Critical Guide, A. Butler & D. Ainslie, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2015), s. 230-51.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Review of Michael Bratman's Shared Agency", Journal of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18: s. 1101-1104.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Is Collective Mental Action Possible?", Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6: s. 843-864.

Szigeti, András. (2015) "Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas", Dialectica 69: s. 1-22.

 

2014

Björnsson, Gunnar and McPherson, Tristram. (2014) "Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the specification problem", Mind, 124: 1–38.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2014) "Incompatibilism and ‘Bypassed’ Agency", in Al Mele (ed.) Surrounding Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press) s. 95–122.

Björnsson, Gunnar and Pereboom, Derk. (2014) "Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing", Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility (MIT Press) s. 27–35.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2014) "Essentially Shared Obligations", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 38 Forward-Looking Collective Moral Responsibility, s. 103–120.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2014) "Responsibility problems for criminal justice", Frontiers of Psychology 5: 821.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2014) "Compatibilism and Personal Identity", Philosophical Studies, 170, 2: s. 317-334

Szigeti, András. (2014) "Focusing Forgiveness as an Emotion", Journal of Value Inquiry 48: s. 217-234.

Szigeti, András. (2014) "Collective Responsibility and Group-Control", In The Individualism/Holism Debate: An Anthology, edited by Julie Zahle et al. Heidelberg: Springer: s. 97-116.

 

2013

Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl. (2013) "A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87: 611-39.

Russell, Paul. (2013) "Responsibility, Naturalism and ‘the Morality System’". Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, David Shoemaker, ed. (Oxford University Press: 2013), 184-204.

Russell, Paul. (2013) "The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates". Edited with Oisin Deery (Oxford University Press: 2013).

Szigeti, András. (2013) "Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?" In Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology, edited by Anita Konzelmann-Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid. Berlin: Springer: s. 329-342.

Szigeti, András. (2013) "Emotions and Heuristics", Journal of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16: s. 845-862.

Szigeti, András. (2013) "Verantwortung ohne Strafe: Was macht Verantwortungszuschreibungen moralisch verbindlich?" In Moral und Sanktion, edited by Eva Buddeberg and Achim Vesper. Frankfurt/New York: Campus: s. 291-316 (in German).

 

2012

Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl. (2012) "The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility", Noûs 46:2 (2012), s. 326–354.

Szigeti, András. (2012) "Revisiting Strawsonian Arguments from Inescapability", Philosophica 85: s. 91-121.

 

Sidansvarig: Andreas Ott|Sidan uppdaterades: 2017-10-31
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